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The indivisible hand of peace? Consumption opportunities and civil war 
 
Abstract: 
GDP is one of the most robust indicators of civil war onset. As debate continues over the 
mechanisms underlying the relationship between economic development and civil war, this 
paper scrutinizes the indicator of GDP directly, disaggregating it into its constituent 
components to examine whether their distinct associations with conflict onset can shed some 
light into the black box. Analysis of the individual correlations allows for identification of the 
driving force behind the aggregate statistical relationship. With this information to hand,  
consistency checks can be made with existing theories and a new theory presented in this paper, 
which draws attention to a critical structural factor that drives the supply of civil war labor, 
namely the lack of consumption opportunities. This factor increases the likelihood of civil war 
in less economically developed countries as individuals with low consumption opportunities 
have little to lose from reordering the economic and political system. Analysis of the 
correlations between components of GDP and the onset of civil war shows that this new theory 
is most consistent with the key drivers of the aggregate relationship. The examination also 
highlights a new indicator, which is arguably preferable to GDP as a measure of this 
relationship. 
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Economic development or lack thereof is one of the most robust indicators of civil war onset 
(Hegre and Sambanis 2006). However, the mechanism underlying this relationship is less clear. 
Explanations range from opportunity cost (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Azam 1995; Grossman 
1995) and state capacity (Fearon and Laitin 2003) to the liberal peace (Hegre, Gissinger, and 
Gleditsch 2003; Ricardo 2000 [1821]). This paper will add another: consumption opportunities. 
The core premise of consumption opportunity theory is that people want to consume 
and need a realizable economic dream in order to buy into the existing political and economic 
order. If opportunities to consume are low and individuals have not bought into an economic 
dream, reordering or destroying the system represents zero loss to the dissident. Subsequently, 
economies which are oriented to encourage domestic consumption are inherently more 
peaceful. 
It is impossible to tell from the indicator of GDP which mechanism – opportunity cost, 
state capacity, liberal peace, or consumption opportunities – can best explain the observed 
relationship. Therefore, this paper will help to shed light on the situation by disaggregating 
GDP into its constituent components and examining the unique relationships between each of 
these indicators and civil war onset. This analysis will show which components are driving the 
aggregate relationship, and further reasoning will suggest which theory is most consistent with 
these findings. The reader should note, however, that this is not a confirmatory analysis. No 
causal evidence is provided to prove or disprove any particular theory. Such evidence is outside 
the scope of the current study. 
Nevertheless, this disaggregation is a significant step, as many previous studies of civil 
war onset use the composite indicator of GDP as a key independent variable (Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Buhaug 2006); or use it as a base upon which to make 
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comparisons with other key independent variables (Fjelde and De Soysa 2009; Buhaug 2006). 
What is critical is that all of these models will give two countries that observe the same GDP 
the same probability of conflict, ceteris paribus, because they do not take into account the 
weight of the disaggregated components mentioned above. This paper will show that country 
A could have a markedly different likelihood of civil war onset from country B, if the 
constitution of GDP in each country differs and thus answer the research question ‘to what 
extent can a disaggregation of GDP shed light on the relationship between economic 
development and internal peace?’ 
The disaggregated demand components of GDP are private production, private 
investment, government expenditure, exports and imports. Results presented in this paper will 
show that the consumption opportunity maximizing elements of private production, 
government expenditure and imports are the most strongly correlated with peace. Whilst 
investment and exports add value to an economy and weigh positively on GDP, growth in these 
areas creates fewer direct consumption opportunities and thus is less likely to induce peaceful 
societies. Furthermore, whilst the component of imports weighs negatively into GDP, its 
impact on civil war onset is in line with the other components, which weigh positively on GDP. 
These findings suggest that a new indexed variable – Consumption Opportunities – should be 
used in preference to GDP, as the indexation of the five factors as outlined above will only lead 
to an averaging out of the effect of an increase in consumption opportunities (Signorino and 
Xiang 2009). 
This research speaks to a key policy concern – how best to engage in development, and, 
more specifically, development for peace. At this time no conflict-affected or fragile country 
has achieved much more than a one or two millennium development goals (World Bank 2013, 






Private investment and production 
In their model based on the work of Azam (1995) and Grossman (1995), Collier and 
Hoeffler (1998) argue that an increase in income leads to a reduced propensity toward conflict 
as the increase in wealth reflects an increase in the opportunity cost of rebellion for all potential 
rebel fighters. Therefore, conflict is less likely in high-income countries as the average wage 
rate is so high as to make rebellion restrictively expensive to entrepreneurs of violence. Using 
per capita income as a proxy for potential opportunity costs in the economy, Collier and 
Hoeffler find that the variable is statistically significantly negatively associated with the 
likelihood of civil war onset. Nevertheless, whilst it is true that per capita income is a good 
proxy of potential opportunity costs, it is also a reasonable proxy for other mechanisms, such 
as consumption opportunities. 
Some authors have used commodity price shocks to proxy for short-term variation in 
wages from productive employment that represents the opportunity cost of conflict (Dube and 
Vargas 2013; Besley and Persson 2008). Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) use rainfall 
as an instrumental variable to predict civil war onset through economic growth. They argue 
that increases in rainfall can lead to enlarged crops, which automatically increases economic 
output and wages. The authors find rainfall to be an effective instrumental variable and show 
that growth and civil war onset are highly significantly negatively correlated, both 
substantively and statistically. 
However, their second-stage model seems somewhat restricted in its time-frame. 
Regressing conflict on growth at both the current period and previous suggests that the time 
horizon of potential rebels is very short: they only consider very recent shocks and set a low 
value to expectations of long-term trends. This indicates that the turn to rebellion is not 
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necessarily a vocational decision but a plan to redress immediate needs, such as procuring 
enough to eat or drink. In contrast to the authors’ conclusions, this short-term perspective, in-
fact, supports the theory presented here that consumption matters more than income. If 
potential rebels truly considered rebellion as a solution to their long-run prosperity, one would 
assume that short-term shocks in wages should not affect their ultimate decision to rebel. 
However, a short-term shock on the availability of food might just motivate someone to seek 
alternative sources and temporarily offer their labor in civil war. This alleviation of scarcity 
that extra rainfall brings has been overlooked by the authors. 
Nevertheless, in summation of this discussion, it is clear that the theory of opportunity 
costs would expect that the likelihood of conflict falls as private investment and production 
rises, due to an increase in incomes. The theory of consumption opportunities, on the other 
hand, would expect the likelihood of conflict to fall much faster with rises in production than 
investment, as investment does not immediately lead to a rise in the availability of consumable 
goods and services. 
 
Trade 
Another expectation of the opportunity cost argument is that as exports and imports rise 
individually, incomes will rise; although, incomes will rise faster with exports than imports. 
This is because exported goods form a direct part of domestic production and thus, income, 
while imports, on the other hand, add to domestic production and income only indirectly as 
imported intermediate goods are converted to consumer goods. Opportunity cost theory 
accordingly expects that there should be a negative correlation between both exports and 
imports and civil war onset, but that exports should be more strongly negatively correlated with 
onset than imports. In contrast, consumption opportunity theory considers imports to represent 
an increase in available opportunities to consume, while exports represent a leakage of 
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consumption opportunities from the economy and therefore might expect a negative 
relationship between imports and civil war onset and a positive relationship between exports 
and onset. 
David Ricardo might disagree, arguing that rises in both exports and imports should 
equally lead to pacific outcomes. In his 1821 book, On the Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation, Ricardo outlined the advantages of open economies and international trade (Ricardo 
2000 [1821]). It was his belief that under almost all circumstances states will benefit from trade 
through the concept of comparative advantage. The resulting total increase in consumption will 
make people happier. 
On the other hand, Bussman and Schneider (2007) propose that trade and liberalization 
may not be eternally positive (Sachs et al. 1995; Ricardo 2000 [1821]), arguing that higher 
levels of economic interconnectedness may indeed be associated with civil peace for reasons 
outlined by Ricardo but that the transition to such a state is often painful for the country. 
‘Foreign economic liberalization decreases the opportunity cost of civil unrest for losers of 
foreign economic liberalization’ (Bussmann and Schneider 2007, 83). Under this situation 
disaffected agents will agitate for policy change, possibly violently. In divergence from 
Bussmann and Schneider, consumption opportunity theory would expect that conflict occurs 
in transition due to an emphasis on increasing the size of the export sector in economies that 
are seeking to liberalize. This emphasis increases export production at the expense of the 
domestic sector, which diminishes the supply of goods and services available to local 
communities. Then, as the open economy grows and becomes more established in the 
international society of states, imports will increase to fill this gap, which results in the long-






Although some governments may choose to restrict public spending, all governments 
have a rational motivation to provide public goods. As Olson (2000) explains, public goods 
raise the productivity of a population; their provision, therefore, drives up the taxable base and, 
thus, tax revenues. Diamond (1997, 287) goes further to claim that ‘large societies can function 
economically only if they have a redistributive economy in addition to a reciprocal economy’.  
Building on competition model literature (Grossman 1991, 1995; Hirshleifer 1988; 
Tullock 1967), Azam (2001, 432) presents a model of civil war as a lottery in which ‘the 
probability of getting the prize... depends on the relative resources invested in the game by the 
two parties [rebels and state]’. In his model the state can raise taxes, the control of which is 
also seen as the prize for winning any rebellion; it can spend on public goods that will pacify 
the population; spend on defense; or spend on repression. Azam’s model predicts that the 
probability of civil war onset increases with the size of the prize but decreases with government 
expenditure on defense and public goods. If Azam’s theory is correct, we should expect 
government expenditure to be the driver behind the relationship between GDP and civil 
conflict; and, not only should this be true but the relationship should be positive – as 
government expenditure rises, civil conflict onset should become more likely. Consumption 
opportunity theory would expect the opposite relation. 
Another theory that would expect the strongest relationship to be between government 
spending and civil conflict onset is state capacity. Though the mechanism of state capacity as 
a cause of peace has a long history in the literature (Azam 2001; Benson and Kugler 1998; 
Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier 2000b), Fearon and Laitin (2003) brought the proposition to 
the fore. For these scholars, state capacity is understood as “state military and police strength”. 
Fearon and Laitin suggest that as a country develops economically, it will have more resources 
to invest in its security forces. Therefore, larger government expenditures should indicate a 
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greater ability of the state to maintain its monopoly of the use of violence. In contrast to this 
theory, this paper will argue that it is the provision of consumption opportunities and the 
alleviation of perceived scarcities that is the driving force behind the relationship between GDP 
and civil war onset, and not an increase in state capacity. This can be distinguished with 





Consuming makes us happy; whether it is a roof over our heads, food in our mouths, or 
a visit to the doctor when we are sick. In economics it is generally accepted that our wants are 
infinite. And so, development and growth of free-market economies are often seen as the best 
way in which to fulfil as many of these wants as possible. 
In more economically developed countries (MEDCs) opportunities to consume are 
many and varied. Economic, political and physical infrastructures are all in place to maximize 
the ability to consume. Though public policies may vary from state to state, the primary aim is 
still to achieve the greatest total social happiness through consumption. However, in less 
economically developed countries (LEDCs) opportunities to consume are less abundant 
because of a lack of this same economic, political and physical infrastructure. 
Indeed, in MEDCs most are able to find a job, save some funds if necessary or take out 
credit to purchase what they would like. And when this is not possible, systems are often in 
place to ensure abilities to consume, such as minimum welfare safety nets and charities that 
will help to fulfil the most important needs. Yet, further to this, are economic dreams. The most 
famous of which is the American dream, which is the belief that anyone who works hard can 
get rich on their own merit. 
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In LEDCs these are regularly just that – dreams. For the poorest in these societies with 
little schooling and no safety net, there are very few prospects for fulfilling their wants. Thus 
far, globalization has not helped to bring economic dreams to all parts of the world. Stuck in 
poverty with seemingly no hope for future prosperity, people may do things that many in 
MEDCs would see as desperate. Yet, if the system is not providing opportunities to fulfil wants 
and dreams, then the reordering of that system may not seem so abhorrent. Someone who has 
received nothing from the existing political and economic order has nothing to lose from its 
destruction. Individuals are, therefore, motivated to offer their labor in civil conflict when 
consumption opportunities, including economic dreams, are low because a change in the 
system may bring about new consumption opportunities. 
Taking this to its logical extreme, we find the slave economy. In this economy slaves 
are forced to work without reward. They are often given only basic food, shelter and clothing, 
if at all. They also have only a very minute possibility of experiencing change in the future as 
a result of their hard work. In such a situation, it is quite understandable that desperate 
individuals can be easily enticed into violence by a political entrepreneur who is able to 
convince them that everything can change if they only overthrow the system. The political front 
and aims of such a movement may vary, yet it is the situation of absolute deprivation and work 
without reward that has set within many a contempt for the current political and economic 
system. 
A much less extreme example, yet with similar economic undertones, is Nicaragua. 
Although, many have explained this conflict as being between the haves and the have-nots, 
when viewed through the lens of consumption opportunity theory, an underlying contempt for 
the political and economic system of the Somoza regime appears to have initially motivated 
many toward violence. During the 1970’s the Nicaraguan economy grew significantly. This 
growth fueled ‘conspicuous consumption’ by the bourgeoisie and ‘undoubtedly raised the 
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aspirations of most urban Nicaraguans’ (Booth 1985, 85) – a key recruitment group for the 
Sandinista National Liberation Front. However, economic mismanagement by the Somoza 
dictatorship meant that ‘Nicaragua’s internal market remained small, and most manufactures 
were exported’ (Booth 1985, 78). At the same time, the apparent ‘food last’ approach in which 
‘the demands of export agriculture for land, credit, and human resources had priority’ (Ryan 
1995, 56) meant that many ordinary Nicaraguans were going without basic necessities. 
Furthermore, with very little government investment in healthcare or education and 
expenditure predominantly ‘confined to building infrastructure for the agro-export sector’ 
(FitzGerald and Grigsby 2001, 122), alternative opportunities to consume were also restricted. 
Given the availability of jobs in the export sector, individuals would have expected increased 
opportunities to consume; however, these opportunities were restricted by poor economic 
policies of the Somoza regime. Continued absolute deprivation with no expectation of future 
change, will have given large portions of the Nicaraguan population a contempt for the political 
and economic system of Somoza. With a distaste for the current system, it is easy to understand 
how individuals could be easily manipulated by political entrepreneurs who taught them to 
blame it on the haves. 
Whilst the collective benefit from group action is clear in these circumstances, the 
collective action problem must still be overcome for war to break out. Thus, insurgent groups 
may offer individuals with low consumption opportunities selective benefits from 
participation. This being said, selective benefits are not the cause of rebellion in LEDCs, they 
simply facilitate group endeavors. Potential rebels are not originally motivated to rebel by these 
incentives but by the economic situation of low consumption opportunities. If individuals were 
motivated purely by opportunity cost, then civil war labor supply would be as present in 
MEDCs as LEDCs – a case we know to be false. 
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Hence, the individual is not motivated by greed because they are not trying to get rich 
out of war. Yet they are also not motivated by grievance held against some other group. They 
are frustrated because they cannot fulfil their wants and see no chance for fulfilling them in the 
future. It is a political entrepreneur, who channels this discontent into grievance against the 
state. As such, consumption opportunity theory does not fall neatly into the greed or grievance 
dichotomy. It is a structural foundation for conflict. With the presence of this element, all it 
takes is a political entrepreneur to convince the potential recruit that the current regime is 
responsible for their state of affairs, and violent conflict will ensue. 
It is now clear why states would be more peaceful if they maximized domestic 
consumption opportunities. However, consumption opportunity theory should not be seen as a 
deterministic argument. Rather, it presents the case of a structural foundation that facilitates 
rebel recruitment. It is a latent factor within a society that increases the likelihood of conflict 
through increased incentives to join a rebellion. The flash-factor that precipitates the onset of 
war could be traced to inequality, religion, ethnicity or any other grievance that is manipulated 
by the demand side of civil war labor.  
If consumption opportunity theory is a good explanation of the development-peace 
relationship, we should expect the following: 





As previously discussed, it is impossible to distinguish between the mechanism of 
consumption opportunities and others previously presented using GDP as an indicator. In such 
a situation Humphreys (2005) recommends disaggregating the explanatory variable. ‘If 
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multiple mechanisms are simultaneously in operation, and each has an independent effect on 
the outcome, then multiple measures may be able to capture the effects of these rival 
mechanisms’ (Humphreys 2005, 519). Following Humphreys’ reasoning, GDP can be 
disaggregated into its five key constituent elements: private consumption, private investment, 
government spending, exports and imports, which will allow for an analysis of their individual 
relationships with civil war onset. The unique variation in these relationships should allow for 
determination of the driving force behind the aggregate relationship and a consistency check 
with each theory highlighted above. 
GDP is calculated by summing private consumption, investment, government 
expenditure and exports, then subtracting the value of imports. Private consumption can be 
defined as ‘expenditure by individuals on domestic and foreign goods and services, produced 
and sold to their final users’. Investment is defined as ‘expenditure on the production of goods 
not for present consumption but rather for future use’. Government expenditure can be defined 
as ‘all government purchases of goods and services’. This will include the provision of public 
services such as the bureaucracy; though, it does not include transfer payments such as welfare 
payments as they do not add output to an economy, they only reflect the exchange of money 
from one source to another. Finally, exports can be defined as all goods and services that are 
produced in a country and sold to foreigners, and imports can be defined as all goods and 
services that are produced by foreigners but purchased by the domestic population (Lipsey and 
Chrystal 1999, 342–44). 
The indicator of private consumption includes expenditure on both domestic and 
foreign goods and services. The distinct imports component specifies the value of these 
consumables that were brought in from abroad. Thus, for the purposes of calculating domestic 
production, imports are subtracted from the total figure. Otherwise, the foreign goods and 
services would be counted as part of domestic production – GDP – which, clearly, they are not. 
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Consumption opportunities are maximized in the components of private consumption 
and government expenditure. As exports are sold to foreigners, they cannot be consumed at 
home. Investment also does not increase current consumption as its focus is on expanding 
future production. While the imports component is also expected to correlate highly with 
consumption opportunities, the impact of these opportunities is already measured in private 
consumption as discussed above. This notwithstanding, the imports component will be 
analyzed along with the others in the econometric models to identify its individual relationship 
with civil war onset and confirm whether its loading into GDP is averaging away the pacific 
effect of this component.  
We should, therefore, expect indicators of private consumption, government spending 
and imports to be most strongly negatively correlated with civil war onset as they each relate 
directly to consumption opportunities. Exports could be expected to be positively correlated 
with onset as these represent a reduction in consumption opportunities. However, increasing 
exports also allows for increasing imports through the process of international exchange. This 
factor may cause this component to be ambiguously related to onset; however, it should 
definitely not be as strongly negatively correlated with onset as private consumption, 
government expenditure or imports. Investment is likely to be weakly correlated with onset as 
it does aid in the expansion of opportunities to consume; although, it is not expected to be as 
strongly correlated with onset as private consumption, government expenditure and imports. 
This is because a large proportion of this expenditure is on items that increase productive 
capacity of consumable items and are not immediately consumable by general members of the 
public, for example, expenditure on new machinery that allows a factory to produce more 
goods. 
In conclusion, private consumption, government expenditure and imports are expected 
to be the most strongly negatively correlated with civil war onset. Investment is expected to be 
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weakly negatively correlated with onset and exports are expected to be positively correlated or 
not correlated with onset at all. If found, these relationships should allow for a distinction from 
other arguments such as opportunity cost, which would predict that the investment, government 
spending and exports components will be equally correlated with onset – a rise in wages in one 
sector should be the same as that in another; imports should be very weakly negatively 
correlated with onset because this component only indirectly adds to income as imported 
intermediary goods are converted into final consumables; and, finally, private consumption 
will be less strongly negatively correlated with civil war onset than investment, government 
expenditure and exports because it is overinflated by the value of imports consumed. 
   Entering all the components into one model simultaneously could generate 
nonsensical results. This is because the absolute values of GDP components will be highly 
correlated with each other.2 That is, as economies grow as a whole, the components tend to 
grow in the same direction. This does not mean, however, that there is no variation in the 
relative size of components.3 Therefore, each component will enter a separate model and its 
effects compared with that of GDP. 
As previously outlined, it is expected that those components most associated with 
raising domestic consumption – private consumption, government expenditure and imports – 
will be the most effective indicators of a reduced propensity toward civil war onset. Therefore, 
an indexed measure of private consumption (containing expenditure on both domestic and 
foreign goods and services) and government spending, termed ‘Consumption Opportunities’, 
will also be evaluated against GDP to see whether the indicator of the development-peace 
relationship can be improved. 
This paper will answer the research question using time-series cross-sectional data of 
150 countries from 1957-2007, which is the largest sample possible given the data availability 
of the covariates. The unit of analysis is country-year with a population of countries at risk of 
16 
 
civil war. With a dichotomous dependent variable of civil war onset, this paper will use logistic 
regression.  
This study will use a random effects model with estimators of both within and between 
unit relationships. Following Bell & Jones (2015) and Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008, 114–
22), within-unit variation is measured by the difference between the yearly observation and the 
unit mean whilst between-unit variation is measured using the unit means. Estimates of the 
within effects are identical in this model to fixed effects (Bell and Jones 2015, 142–43); 
however, this method also allows for a consistent estimation of between effects, as the mean 
of each within-effect covariate is equal to zero. 
Bell and Jones (2015) have shown that this model is superior to standard random effects 
and pooled models in the estimation of between effects. As the theory presented above is 
specifically interested in assessing the between effect across countries of the world, it is 
believed that this model allows for the most accurate estimation of the parametres. 
The issue of endogeneity caused by reverse causality is severely reduced in this model 
as between effects are time-invariant and any reverse causality would need to be so severe as 
to suggest that LEDCs are only poor compared to MEDCs because they experience more 
conflict. 
 
Independent and dependent variables 
The key independent variables are private consumption, private investment, 
government expenditure, exports and imports measured at purchasing power parity in real per 
capita income at constant 2005 prices. These variables are generated using data taken from 
Penn World Table (PWT), which provides information on GDP share for each of the 
components per country-year, combined with the expanded GDP data of Gleditsch (2002).3 
Where GDP is used in its own right as a covariate, this vector is that of Gleditsch (2002). 
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As pointed out by Jerven in his book Poor Numbers, much of the developing world’s 
statistical data may be incomplete, based on models of growth rather than measurement or 
simply the reporting of an individual’s best guess (Jerven 2013). Therefore, there is expected 
to be at least some measurement error in the data. This is most obviously seen in the ‘residual’ 
indicator provided by PWT, which measures deviation from the 100% maximum total GDP 
figure when the five components are linearly combined. This indicator varies from -74% to 
+80%, has a standard deviation of 10% but a mean close to zero. Whilst it is troubling that 
some countries can report detailed component information that does not add up to 100%, there 
is little that can be done at this stage, except to recognize the poor quality of some of this data 
and use it faute de mieux. 
The indexed indicator of Consumption Opportunities will linearly add private 
consumption and government expenditure as these are expected to capture opportunities to 
consume most directly. It will be compared against GDP in its original form, and a new index, 
which will be called here the Gross Domestic Peace Product (GDPP). GDPP linearly adds 
private consumption, investment, government expenditure, and exports but does not subtract 
imports as with GDP. GDPP is produced because it is expected that the current indexation of 
GDP is averaging away the effects of its individual components on the likelihood of civil war 
onset and is, thus, a deficient indicator of peace. 
The key dependent variable is civil war onset and is obtained from the UCDP Monadic 
Conflict Onset and Incidence Dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, and Eriksson et al., 2002; 
Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015). Conflict is defined as ‘a contested incompatibility that 
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of 
which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths’ 
(Themnér 2015, 1). The original prevalence variable is coded 1 for years in which conflict is 
observed and zero for all other years. A new conflict is coded if prevalence returns to zero for 
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at least two consecutive years. The onset variable used in this study drops observations for all 




The brevity of peace is included in the model to allow the most accurate estimation of 
the within effects given the time-dependence of many of these estimators (Beck, Katz, and 
Tucker 1998). The variable is measured in years since the last incidence of civil war and is 
taken from Hegre, Karlsen, and Nygård et al. (2013), being extended backward and forward to 
cover the entire length of the sample period described above and converted through a decay 
function to give it a half-life of four years (Raknerud and Hegre 1997, 393). 
A dummy variable indicating a neighboring country in conflict will enter the model as 
such close proximity to another war is likely to have an effect on all components of GDP. 
Given evidence to suggest that bad neighborhoods increase the likelihood of civil war onset 
(K. S. Gleditsch 2007), this dummy will enter the model to minimize omitted variable bias. 
The variable is taken from Gleditsch (2007) and expanded with observations contained in 
Hegre et al. (2013). 
Trade openness will enter the model to ensure that observed relationships between 
imports and exports with civil war onset are not merely a reflection of the expected relationship 
between trade openness and civil war onset through a liberal peace mechanism. The indicator 
represents exports plus imports over GDP; original data being obtained from Penn World 
Tables. 
Democratic institutions may potentially confound the relationship between 
consumption opportunities and civil war as increasing political rights will increase demand for 
economic rights and thus growth. Given previous research and the established connections 
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between civil war onset, democracy and polyarchy (Hegre et al. 2001) it is, therefore, pertinent 
to enter the model as a both a linear and quadratic control. The measure of democracy used 
will be the Scalar Index of Polities (Gates et al. 2006), formed using data from the Polity IV 
project and Vanhanen and Lundell’s ‘Measures of Democracy 1800-2012’ dataset. 
Region dummies will enter the model to help control for omitted variable bias that 
correlates with different regions of the globe. The regions included are North America, South 
America, Europe, Asia, North Africa, South-East Asia and Australasia with Sub-Saharan 
Africa as the reference category. 
Two final control variables are drawn from the V-Dem data set. Firstly, a measure of 
social group discrimination will enter the model as it is possible under certain circumstances 
that the benefits of any government spending, for example, will not be distributed equally 
amongst the population (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Given previous research into the link 
between horizontal inequalities and civil war onset (Stewart 2002), this variable is considered 
relevant to add as a control. Secondly, petroleum production per capita will enter the model to 
control for the influence of primary commodity dependence (Humphreys 2005; Le Billon 2001; 
Ross 2004; Collier 2000a; Weinstein 2005; Collier and Hoeffler 2005) that may also affect the 




Table 1. GDP and the onset of civil war 
_________________ 





Results of the logistic regressions can be viewed in Table 1, which shows between and 
within effects, calculated in the same model, side-by-side. Anticipated between relationships 
are found in the data and are robust to the inclusion of control variables (Levine and Renelt 
1992). Model 1 contains only the indexed variable of GDP. Models 2 to 6 reveal the 
relationships between the individual components of GDP and civil war onset, controlling for 
the same factors, using the same sample. The results clearly support private domestic 
consumption (model 2) as the power behind the strong relationship between the indexed 
variable of GDP and civil war onset. They also show that imports have the opposite impact on 
civil war onset from that expected given the current method of indexation. A negative 
coefficient indicates that as the number of imports rises, the probability of civil war onset is 
reduced. Furthermore, this finding is robust to the inclusion of trade openness. 
It is interesting to note that there are seemingly no within effects of GDP, or any of its 
components, on the likelihood of civil war onset. This is consistent with previous findings in 
cross-country analyses (Djankov and Reynal‐Querol 2010; Jensen and Sørensen 2012). The 
measure of social group discrimination has a positive and statistically significant between 
effect in all models. However, it has a negative within effect, although this is not statistically 
significant at the 5% level in any model. Democracy is not found to have a significant between 
effect. Somewhat surprisingly, on the other hand, its within effect is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the transition from autocracy to democracy is 
fraught with conflict. There is also evidence in these models for an inverted-U shaped 
relationship as previously theorized.5 
 
Table 2. GDP comparison with GDPP and Consumption Opportunities 
_________________ 





Table 2 presents the results of the same analysis conducted with two new indexed 
measures – GDPP and Consumption Opportunities. As can be seen GDPP and Consumption 
Opportunities are substantively and statistically more significant than GDP. Movement one 
standard deviation either side of the mean of GDP changes the probability of civil war onset in 
Model 1 from 1.9% to 5.9% (all other variables at their means). This change of 211% is not 
statistically significant. In contrast, movement one standard deviation either side of the mean 
of Consumption Opportunities in Model 8 changes the probability of civil war onset from 1.7% 
to 6.4% (all other variables at their means). The change of 288% is much larger than that of 
GDP and is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
_________________ 
Figure 1 near here 
_________________ 
Figure 1. Between Effects of Consumption Opportunities on Civil War Onset 
 
The difference between the power of the two variables can be seen clearly in Figure 1. 
This shows the probability of civil war onset running from 0.6% to 11.1% across the range of 
Consumption Opportunities whilst only running from 0.7% to 9.6% across the range of GDP. 
One of the most telling examples of this difference is the case of Iraq. From 1973 to 1995 Iraq 
experienced the onset of five civil wars. By GDP and model 1, the probability of conflict onset 
was 14.7% on average across the 5 observations; by Consumption Opportunities and model 8, 
the probability of conflict across the 5 observations was 18.3%. This is an increase of 3.6 
percentage points solely because Consumption Opportunities has been used to predict conflict 







Results presented in Table 1 show that previous relationships found between GDP and 
civil war onset in cross-country analyses are the result of the influence of between effects – the 
within effects are all close to zero with none being statistically significant (Besley and Persson 
2008; Dube and Vargas 2013; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004; Collier and Hoeffler 
1998). It is also clear that the primary substantive significance of GDP as an indicator of civil 
war onset is driven by private domestic consumption. Being measured in a logged function of 
2005 international dollars per capita, the coefficients of GDP, its components, GDPP and 
Consumption Opportunities are all directly comparable. Domestic production has a coefficient 
of -0.76, which is much stronger even than GDP itself, with a coefficient of -0.57. This suggests 
that the impact of domestic production and consumption is being averaged out in the indexed 
measure (Signorino and Xiang 2009). The next strongest components of GDP are imports and 
government spending with coefficients of -0.64 and -0.50 respectively. The coefficients of 
exports and private investment are much lower at -0.20 and -0.38 respectively. 
The results presented in models 2 to 6 are most consistent with the theory of 
consumption opportunities and hypothesis H1. Domestic consumption, government spending 
and imports appear to be driving the relationship between GDP and onset, suggesting that the 
increased consumption opportunities brought about through growth in these areas would lead 
to a reduced propensity toward civil conflict. Investment is less strongly correlated with civil 
war onset. This is likely because investment does not relate to an immediate increase in 
consumable goods and may take some time before new production relieves perceived scarcities 
– a shift that will then be reflected in domestic consumption figures. 
23 
 
Imports are found to be negatively correlated with civil war onset as expected. This 
suggests that as increasing amounts of goods are brought into an economy, the relief of scarcity 
is reducing the propensity toward conflict. Interestingly, exports are not found to be 
significantly statistically correlated with civil war onset in model 5. This suggests that the 
reduction in consumption opportunities which results from the goods being sent abroad has a 
powerful impact on societies; one that is not easily overcome by latter increases in consumption 
through related rises in imports. 
 
Table 3. Expected relationships between components of GDP and the probability of civil war 
onset 
_________________ 
Table 3 near here 
_________________ 
 
Table 3 above gives a summary of the alternative expected relationships between the 
components of GDP and civil war onset from competing theories outlined in the previous 
research section of this paper. The findings presented above are in clear contrast to the 
opportunity cost theory, which would suppose that investment, government expenditure, and 
exports are the most strongly negatively associated with civil war onset. Investment, 
government spending and exports will all equally raise the income of a country and thus 
increase opportunity cost equally, whilst imports will only reflect a minor increase in income 
through the conversion of intermediary goods. Because private consumption includes 
expenditure on imports, it should be less strongly associated with civil war onset than 
investment government spending or exports. Finding the strongest relationship between 
domestic consumption and civil war onset, combined with a strong negative relationship with 
imports and weaker associations between investment, government spending and exports shows 
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less support for the opportunity cost theory as the driving force behind the robust relationship 
between GDP and civil war onset. Indeed, examination of the correlations suggests that it is 
more likely to be increasing consumption opportunities and not wages that are driving 
relationships found in previous research (Besley and Persson 2008; Dube and Vargas 2013; 
Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004; Collier and Hoeffler 1998). To add further weight to 
these findings, more fine-grained analyses that can distinguish between wage and consumption 
opportunity shifts and provide causal evidence of conflict onset should be undertaken. This 
will allow for scrutiny of previous research that assumes a link between increased income and 
civil war onset works through wages (Besley and Persson 2008; Dube and Vargas 2013; 
Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004). 
When government budgets rise, the amount available to spend on defense and potential 
‘state capacity’ will also rise (Azam 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003). If this theory were to 
explain the power behind the relationship between GDP and civil war onset, we should expect 
the indicator of government spending to be the most strongly negatively correlated with onset. 
While a statistically significant negative relationship appears to exist between government 
spending and onset, this relationship is weaker than private production and imports, suggesting 
that it is not the driving force behind the robust relationship between GDP and onset. 
Control of the state or state funds is the goal of many rebel leaders, whether the cause 
is secession or a change of government. Following the logic of Azam (2001), it can be argued 
that the size of state funds also represents the size of the prize. Thus, we should expect the 
opposite relationship between government expenditure and civil war onset as set out in the 
previous paragraph. This is clearly not found to be the case in the current sample and so no 
support is detected for the use of GDP as an indicator of the size of the prize mechanism. 
Finally, Hegre, Gissinger and Gleditsch (2003) argue that the effect of trade on civil 
war onset appears to work through its effect on growth and thus the opportunity cost of conflict. 
25 
 
However, in contrast to the opportunity cost argument, they expect that total trade will have 
this impact and not exports or imports individually. As a result, they would expect that growth 
in imports and exports together should reduce the likelihood of civil war onset.  This is not 
seen in any of the models with the indicator of the between effect of total trade being 
statistically insignificant at the 5% level in all regressions, further suggesting that international 
trade is not the driving force behind the robust relationship between GDP and civil war onset. 
There is also no support for Bussmann and Schneider’s (2007) proposition that transition to an 
open economy and the increase in exports is potentially conflict causing with no within effect 
of the value of exports found. Further research is required to determine exactly why no between 
effect is found here between exports and civil war onset. 
In summation of this review, it appears that the results presented in Table 1 are most 
consistent with the consumption opportunities mechanism as the driving force behind the 
robust relationship between GDP and civil war onset. Results are less consistent with 
opportunity cost, state capacity, size of the prize and the liberal peace. 
Further to these findings is the confirmation that imports are positively related to civil 
war onset when they are indexed into GDP through the net exports function. Consequently, 
they are averaging out the effect of other components and dulling the overall impact of GDP 
as an indicator of civil war onset (Signorino and Xiang 2009). If this component is instead left 
out of an indexed variable, creating GDPP, the substantive effect of the variable increases from 
-0.57 to -0.61 in this sample as seen in Table 2. 
The new indicator of Consumption Opportunities fares even better with a beta 
coefficient of -0.75, which is substantively and statistically more significant than either GDP 
or GDPP. Figure 1 shows the difference in substantive impact and the example of Iraq, which 
had a much higher probability of onset across five observations, highlights the point that the 
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indexed indicator of GDP may obscure the true likelihood of conflict in a country as the weight 
of its components is not taken into account.  
In this light, perhaps the indicator of Consumption Opportunities should be 
incorporated into models of civil war onset rather than GDP. If nothing else, GDPP should be 
used as results presented here clearly show that the method of GDP indexation is inconsistent 
with the individual statistical relationships between components of GDP and civil war onset. 
That is, it is a deficient indicator of peace. 
 
Alternative specifications and checks of robustness6 
To check the robustness of the results additional controls of foreign aid and the 
previously mentioned reporting error indicator were also individually added to the base model. 
Interpretations presented above were found to be robust to the inclusion of these variables and 
to the exclusion of region dummies and influential cases. 
When using an indicator of civil war onset that attributes a positive observation only 
when battle-related deaths reach 1,000 in one year, all of the relationships between GDP and 
its components lose statistical significance, except for imports. This is most likely because the 
total number of positive observations drops from 198 to 64, or from 4.0% of observations to 
only 1.2%. Unfortunately, data on the components of GDP is not available from known sources 
before 1950. It is hoped that this data will become available in the near future to allow for a 
full assessment of the components of GDP and their relationships with the onset of intense civil 
wars. 
It could be argued that inequality is driving the relationship between low consumption 
opportunities in LEDCs and conflict. If there is little to go around but some have more than 
others, then this is what is driving grievances. However, this cannot be the case in the observed 
relationships above as inequality is increasing in consumption opportunities. That is, the states 
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with the lowest consumption opportunities and most conflict also have the lowest income 
inequality. It is, therefore, unlikely that this factor is driving the observed relationship. 
Of course, the analysis between components of GDP and civil war onset could be taken 
further to consider the distinct impact of sub-components of consumer spending, investment, 
government expenditure, exports and imports and their weighting in these composite variables. 
Indeed, some have argued that certain government expenditures are more peace inducing than 
others, for example, education as opposed to military spending (Berthélemy, Azam, and Calipel 
1996). Whilst this may undeniably be the case, such an extension is beyond the scope of this 





The purpose of this study was to examine GDP as an indicator of the development-
peace relationship. With multiple competing mechanisms theorized to explain the association, 
this paper disaggregated GDP into its constituent components to establish the driving force 
behind the robust statistical relationship.  With this information at hand, consistency with 
previous theories could be established. This paper also presented a new theory – consumption 
opportunities – which pertains to one’s ability to fulfil consumption wants or needs, or to have 
a good expectation of being able to fulfil those wants or needs in the future. If this condition is 
not met, conflict onset is more likely. 
Evidence presented here shows that the consumption opportunity maximizing elements 
of private production, government spending and imports appear to be the driving force behind 
the robust relationship between GDP and civil war onset. Findings are less consistent with 
opportunity cost, state capacity, size of the prize and liberal peace. Though additional research 
28 
 
is required to extend the scope of this evidence, it is found to be robust to model specification 
in the current sample. Future research might employ quantitative and qualitative methods to 
test the mechanism presented and provide causal evidence. Results also suggested that the 
measures of GDPP or Consumption Opportunities, rather than GDP, should enter future models 
of civil war onset to more accurately capture the relationship with economic development. 
This analysis suggests that peace and development can be achieved at the same time if 
growth is geared toward the maximization of domestic consumption opportunities. Export-led 
growth, for example, is less likely to make societies more internally peaceful if it is 
aggressively pursued at the expense of domestic markets and growth in local consumption 
opportunities. Indeed, when individuals can see the economic system working for them and 
have expectations of a better future, we are much less likely to see disastrous civil conflicts 




1. See table A2 of the appendix for correlation matrix of the key independent variables. 
2. See figures A1-3, which show how the proportion of each component can change year 
on year within one country. On the other hand, it is still likely that countries with low 
levels of income will have low levels of each component, whilst high income 
countries will have high levels of each. 
3. Updated version 6.0 beta of this database is available at 
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html. 
4. See Vreeland (2008) for discussion of origins of this theory. 
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This appendix contains figures and tables of additional observations within the data and from 
the models specified in the paper. 
 
Example of variation in the components of GDP across time 
The following figures illustrate that the components of GDP, being domestic production (C), 
domestic investment (I), government spending (G), exports (X) and imports (M) vary across 
both time and space. That is, they are not constant relative to each other and various economic 
and social forces can lead to restructuring of the economy. 
 
Figure A1. Cross-Time Variation in the Share of C, I, G, X and M in the UK 
_________________ 
Figure A1 near here 
_________________ 
Figure A2. Cross-Time Variation in the Share of C, I, G, X and M in Venezuela 
_________________ 
Figure A2 near here 
_________________ 
 
Figure A3. Cross-Time Variation in the Share of C, I, G, X and M in Zambia 
_________________ 





Table A1. Summary Statistics 
_________________ 
Table A1 near here 
_________________ 
 
Figure A4. Key Independent Variables Univariate Kernal Density – Between Indicators 
_________________ 




Figure A5. Key Independent Variables Univariate Kernal Density – Within Indicators 
_________________ 
Figure A5 near here 
_________________ 




Figure A6 near here 
_________________ 
 
Figure A7. Control Variables Univariate Kernal Density – Within Indicators 
_________________ 
Figure A7 near here 
_________________ 
 
Table A2. Correlation matrix between key independent variables 
_________________ 




Alternative model specifications 
The following tables present various model re-specifications as checks of robustness. 
 
Table A3. Additional control: Net ODA 
_________________ 
Table A3 near here 
_________________ 
 
Table A4. Additional control: Reporting residual 
_________________ 
Table A4 near here 
_________________ 
 
Table A5. Key independent variables and inequality 
_________________ 
Table A5 near here 
_________________ 
 
Table A6. GDP and the onset of civil war (>1,000 battle-related deaths) 
_________________ 

















The identification of influential cases was completed through DFBETA leverage analyses, the 
results of which are shown in Figure A8. 
 
Figure A8. DFBETA leverage analysis 
_________________ 
Figure A8 near here 
_________________ 
 
Table A8 shows the results of a repeated analysis of the data when omitting ‘influential cases’ 
(DFBETA above 0.015 or below 0.015 as per Figure A8). In Model A25 GDP becomes 
insignificant. Investment also becomes insignificant in model A27. However, the substantive 
significance of private consumption and imports increases in models A26 and A30 compared 
to models 2 and 6. As these are two of the main drivers of increased consumption opportunities, 
the results presented below further support the hypothesis, H1. 
_________________ 





Table 1. GDP and the onset of civil war 







































GDP per capita (log) -0.57**      -0.04      
(0.26)      (0.26)      
Total Private 
Production/pc (log) 
 -0.76**      0.05     
 (0.30)      (0.27)     
Total Private 
Investment/pc (log) 
  -0.38**      0.08    
  (0.18)      (0.14)    
Total Government 
Spending/pc (log) 
   -0.50**      0.02   
   (0.22)      (0.17)   
Total Exports/pc (log)     -0.20      -0.17  
    (0.17)      (0.13)  
Total Imports/pc (log)      -0.64***      -0.01 
     (0.21)      (0.15) 
Discrimination 0.63*** 0.65*** 0.62*** 0.60*** 0.62*** 0.63*** -0.30* -0.30* -0.30 -0.30* -0.31* -0.30* 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Oil Production -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Neighbor at War 0.24 0.10 0.43 0.39 0.31 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.14 
 (0.72) (0.71) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.70) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Trade openness -1.19* -1.16* -1.07 -1.11 -0.84 0.39 -0.79 -0.80 -0.86 -0.80 -0.32 -0.75 
 (0.68) (0.67) (0.70) (0.69) (0.84) (0.84) (0.60) (0.59) (0.61) (0.60) (0.69) (0.69) 
Democracy 1.88 1.61 1.61 2.61 2.34 2.09 3.42** 3.44** 3.47** 3.43** 3.40** 3.44** 
 (3.10) (3.08) (3.10) (3.10) (3.13) (3.03) (1.52) (1.52) (1.52) (1.52) (1.52) (1.52) 
Democracy2 -0.09 0.45 0.04 -1.01 -1.00 0.01 -2.76* -2.80* -2.84* -2.79* -2.69* -2.77* 
 (2.82) (2.83) (2.83) (2.76) (2.81) (2.73) (1.58) (1.57) (1.58) (1.58) (1.57) (1.57) 
Peace Decay       -0.62* -0.61 -0.60 -0.62* -0.70* -0.61 
       (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37) 
Constant 0.17 1.28 -2.14* -1.43 -3.15*** -1.23       
 (2.04) (2.20) (1.22) (1.39) (1.09) (1.22)       
AIC 1,411 1,409 1,411 1,411 1,413 1,407       
No. of Observations 5,007 5,007 5,007 5,007 5,007 5,007       
No. of Countries 150 150 150 150 150 150       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Region fixed effects omitted from table.
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Table 2. GDP comparison with GDPP and Consumption Opportunities 





















GDP per capita (log) -0.57**   -0.04   
(0.26)   (0.26)   
GDPP per capita (log)  -0.61**   -0.08  




  -0.75***   0.01 
  (0.29)   (0.27) 
Discrimination 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.63*** -0.30* -0.30 -0.30* 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Oil Production -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Neighbor at War 0.24 0.26 0.20 0.14 0.15 0.14 
 (0.72) (0.71) (0.71) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Trade Openness -1.19* -0.92 -1.11* -0.79 -0.74 -0.79 
 (0.68) (0.70) (0.67) (0.60) (0.61) (0.59) 
Democracy 1.88 1.90 1.88 3.42** 3.41** 3.43** 
 (3.10) (3.09) (3.07) (1.52) (1.52) (1.52) 
Democracy2 -0.09 -0.06 0.11 -2.76* -2.74* -2.78* 
 (2.82) (2.81) (2.80) (1.58) (1.57) (1.57) 
Peace Decay    -0.62* -0.63* -0.61* 
    (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) 
Constant 0.17 0.39 1.34    
 (2.04) (2.07) (2.19)    
AIC 1,411 1,411 1,409    
No. of Observations 5,007 5,007 5,007    
No. of Countries 150 150 150    





































































Size of the 
Prize Liberal Peace 
Consumption Strong (-)’ve Moderate (-)’ve - - - 
Investment Weak (-)’ve Strong (-)’ve - - - 
Government Strong (-)’ve Strong (-)’ve Strong (-)’ve Strong (+)’ve - 
Exports Ambiguous Strong (-)’ve - - Strong (-)’ve 
Imports Strong (-)’ve Weak (-)’ve - - Strong (-)’ve 
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Table A1. Summary statistics     
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Between         
Civil war onset 0.040 0.195 0.000 1.000 
GDP per capita (log) 8.274 1.127 6.059 11.292 
Total Private 
Production/pc (log) 7.789 1.030 5.824 9.875 
Total Private 
Investment/pc (log) 6.502 1.487 3.114 9.602 
Total Government Spending/pc 
(log) 6.532 1.135 3.661 9.667 
Total Exports/pc (log) 6.195 1.746 0.346 10.918 
Total Imports/pc (log) 6.410 1.600 2.628 10.261 
Consumption Opportunities 8.075 1.020 6.121 10.483 
Discrimination -0.484 1.213 -2.995 2.471 
Discrimination -0.484 1.213 -2.995 2.471 
Petroleum production per capita 398.855 2,037.694 0.000 21,680.390 
Neighbor at war 0.688 0.278 0.000 1.000 
Trade openness 0.414 0.290 0.028 2.023 
SIP 0.590 0.275 0.020 0.994 
SIP2 0.464 0.322 0.001 0.987 
Within         
GDP per capita (log) 0.000 0.375 -1.674 1.705 
Total Private 
Production/pc (log) 0.000 0.359 -2.042 2.068 
Total Private 
Investment/pc (log) 0.000 0.569 -3.286 1.997 
Total Government Spending/pc 
(log) 0.000 0.501 -2.721 2.223 
Total Exports/pc (log) 0.000 0.781 -7.237 3.397 
Total Imports/pc (log) 0.000 0.727 -6.750 3.674 
Discrimination 0.000 0.475 -3.104 2.023 
Petroleum production per capita 0.000 1,821.858 -15,219.700 56,908.410 
Neighbor at war 0.000 0.371 -0.978 0.974 
Trade openness 0.000 0.178 -0.741 1.246 
SIP 0.000 0.203 -0.824 0.613 
SIP2 0.000 0.208 -0.792 0.630 










Table A2. Correlation matrix between key independent variables 
  GDP Consumption Investment Government Exports Imports 
GDP 1           
Consumption 0.9828 1         
Investment 0.9631 0.9365 1       
Government 0.9382 0.8905 0.8969 1     
Exports 0.9064 0.8845 0.8745 0.8606 1   
Imports 0.8873 0.8875 0.863 0.8448 0.9566 1 
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Table A3. Additional control: Net ODA 







































GDP per capita (log) -0.61**      -0.25      
(0.27)      (0.28)      
Total Private 
Production/pc (log) 
 -0.81***      -0.11     
 (0.30)      (0.30)     
Total Private 
Investment/pc (log) 
  -0.42**      -0.01    
  (0.18)      (0.15)    
Total Government 
Spending/pc (log) 
   -0.56**      -0.05   
   (0.22)      (0.18)   
Total Exports/pc (log)     -0.23      -0.26*  
    (0.17)      (0.13)  
Total Imports/pc (log)      -0.63***      -0.04 
     (0.21)      (0.16) 
Discrimination 0.58*** 0.59*** 0.56*** 0.55*** 0.56*** 0.58*** -0.25 -0.26 -0.27 -0.26 -0.29 -0.27 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Oil Production -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Neighbor at war 0.60 0.45 0.82 0.78 0.62 0.45 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.72) (0.71) (0.73) (0.73) (0.72) (0.70) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Trade openness -0.37 -0.35 -0.18 -0.35 0.15 1.06 -1.15* -1.17* -1.13* -1.15* -0.47 -1.05 
 (0.72) (0.71) (0.74) (0.73) (0.88) (0.85) (0.64) (0.64) (0.65) (0.65) (0.72) (0.73) 
Democracy 0.08 -0.10 -0.43 0.51 0.14 0.19 3.05* 3.13** 3.11** 3.06* 3.07** 3.12** 
 (3.13) (3.10) (3.12) (3.17) (3.17) (3.08) (1.56) (1.57) (1.57) (1.56) (1.56) (1.56) 
Democracy2 1.46 1.92 1.87 0.81 1.00 1.55 -2.41 -2.52 -2.52 -2.47 -2.42 -2.52 
 (2.90) (2.90) (2.91) (2.92) (2.92) (2.84) (1.65) (1.65) (1.65) (1.65) (1.64) (1.64) 
Net ODA -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Peace decay       -0.99** -0.98** -0.97** -0.96** -1.10*** -0.96** 
       (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.41) 
Constant 0.44 1.57 -2.00* -1.14 -2.91*** -1.22       
 (1.98) (2.15) (1.15) (1.34) (1.05) (1.17)       
No. of observations 3,515 3,515 3,515 3,515 3,515 3,515       
No. of countries 119 119 119 119 119 119       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Region fixed effects omitted from table.
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Table A4. Additional control: Reporting residual 







































GDP per capita (log) -0.59**      -0.08      
(0.26)      (0.26)      
Total Private 
Production/pc (log) 
 -0.81***      0.06     
 (0.30)      (0.27)     
Total Private 
Investment/pc (log) 
  -0.42**      0.08    
  (0.18)      (0.14)    
Total Government 
Spending/pc (log) 
   -0.50**      0.01   
   (0.22)      (0.17)   
Total Exports/pc (log)     -0.23      -0.16  
    (0.17)      (0.13)  
Total Imports/pc (log)      -0.61***      -0.05 
     (0.21)      (0.15) 
Discrimination 0.68*** 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.64*** 0.67*** 0.66*** -0.30* -0.30* -0.30 -0.30* -0.31* -0.31* 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Oil Production -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Neighbor at war 0.05 -0.12 0.21 0.20 0.11 0.05 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.16 
 (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.73) (0.71) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) 
Trade openness -1.26* -1.22* -1.12 -1.18* -0.82 0.26 -0.66 -0.68 -0.73 -0.68 -0.22 -0.53 
 (0.68) (0.67) (0.69) (0.69) (0.83) (0.86) (0.59) (0.59) (0.60) (0.60) (0.68) (0.70) 
Democracy 1.44 1.09 1.05 2.20 1.90 1.84 3.40** 3.43** 3.46** 3.42** 3.37** 3.45** 
 (3.09) (3.07) (3.09) (3.10) (3.12) (3.03) (1.52) (1.52) (1.52) (1.52) (1.52) (1.51) 
Democracy2 0.45 1.13 0.76 -0.52 -0.41 0.25 -2.75* -2.83* -2.85* -2.80* -2.69* -2.79* 
 (2.82) (2.83) (2.84) (2.77) (2.81) (2.73) (1.57) (1.57) (1.58) (1.58) (1.57) (1.57) 
Reporting Residual 0.04 0.05* 0.05* 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Peace decay       -0.65* -0.63* -0.62* -0.64* -0.72* -0.66* 
       (0.38) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37) (0.38) (0.38) 
Constant 0.37 1.70 -1.86 -1.33 -2.94*** -1.32       
 (2.03) (2.19) (1.22) (1.39) (1.09) (1.22)       
No. of observations 5,007 5,007 5,007 5,007 5,007 5,007       
No. of countries 150 150 150 150 150 150       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Region fixed effects omitted from table.
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table A5. Key independent variables and inequality 
 A13 A14 A15 A16 A17 A18 
 Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality 
Consumption 
Opportunities 
0.05***      
(0.00)      
Total Private 
Production/pc (log) 
 0.05***     
 (0.00)     
Total Private 
Investment/pc (log) 
  0.03***    
  (0.00)    
Total Government 
Spending/pc (log) 
   0.04***   
   (0.00)   
Total Exports/pc (log)     0.02***  
    (0.00)  
Total Imports/pc (log)      0.03*** 
     (0.00) 
Constant 0.56*** 0.58*** 0.75*** 0.69*** 0.81*** 0.79*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Observations 4,938 4,938 4,938 4,938 4,938 4,938 
Number of countries 148 148 148 148 148 148 
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Table A6. GDP and the onset of civil war (>1,000 battle-related deaths) 







































GDP per capita (log) -0.29      0.21      
(0.38)      (0.43)      
Total Private 
Production/pc (log) 
 -0.16      -0.05     
 (0.44)      (0.44)     
Total Private 
Investment/pc (log) 
  -0.36      0.32    
  (0.23)      (0.24)    
Total Government 
Spending/pc (log) 
   -0.42      0.25   
   (0.29)      (0.30)   
Total Exports/pc (log)     0.01      0.03  
    (0.25)      (0.17)  
Total Imports/pc (log)      -0.75**      -0.05 
     (0.31)      (0.18) 
Discrimination 0.85*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.86*** -0.20 -0.22 -0.17 -0.16 -0.22 -0.20 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
Oil Production -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Neighbor at War 1.80* 1.80* 1.94* 1.83* 1.89* 1.37 1.56** 1.58** 1.53** 1.57** 1.57** 1.61** 
 (1.07) (1.09) (1.05) (1.07) (1.08) (1.05) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) 
Trade openness -3.11*** -3.26*** -2.83** -2.90*** -3.46** -0.53 -0.57 -0.48 -0.80 -0.62 -0.65 -0.20 
 (1.13) (1.16) (1.12) (1.11) (1.56) (1.42) (1.19) (1.19) (1.23) (1.19) (1.41) (1.32) 
Democracy 0.59 0.57 0.28 1.31 0.51 0.77 -5.15** -5.23** -5.20** -5.09** -5.25** -4.97** 
 (3.80) (3.83) (3.67) (3.86) (3.83) (3.87) (2.12) (2.12) (2.12) (2.12) (2.13) (2.11) 
Democracy2 1.72 1.57 2.38 1.13 1.35 2.55 4.21* 4.32* 4.34* 4.24* 4.31* 4.08* 
 (3.40) (3.44) (3.32) (3.39) (3.38) (3.44) (2.30) (2.30) (2.28) (2.29) (2.30) (2.28) 
Peace Decay       2.70*** 2.71*** 2.65*** 2.65*** 2.72*** 2.66*** 
       (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) 
Constant -4.52 -5.39* -4.98*** -4.53** -6.50*** -3.60**       
 (2.87) (3.11) (1.58) (1.85) (1.52) (1.68)       
AIC 612 613 609 610 613 607       
No. of Observations 5,404 5,404 5,404 5,404 5,404 5,404       
No. of Countries 145 145 145 145 145 145       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Region fixed effects omitted from table. 
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Table A7. The exclusion of region dummies 







































GDP per capita (log) -0.49**      -0.03      
(0.23)      (0.26)      
Total Private 
Production/pc (log) 
 -0.64**      0.05     
 (0.25)      (0.27)     
Total Private 
Investment/pc (log) 
  -0.35**      0.08    
  (0.16)      (0.15)    
Total Government 
Spending/pc (log) 
   -0.42**      0.02   
   (0.20)      (0.17)   
Total Exports/pc (log)     -0.22      -0.17  
    (0.16)      (0.13)  
Total Imports/pc (log)      -0.56***      -0.01 
     (0.18)      (0.15) 
Discrimination 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.68*** 0.65*** 0.69*** 0.68*** -0.30* -0.30* -0.30* -0.30* -0.31* -0.30* 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Oil Production 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Neighbor at War 0.98 0.87 1.11* 1.11* 0.93 0.87 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.15 
 (0.66) (0.65) (0.66) (0.67) (0.66) (0.64) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Trade openness -1.25* -1.21* -1.11 -1.18* -0.75 0.23 -0.79 -0.80 -0.85 -0.80 -0.32 -0.75 
 (0.67) (0.67) (0.69) (0.69) (0.82) (0.83) (0.60) (0.60) (0.61) (0.60) (0.68) (0.69) 
Democracy 2.63 2.41 2.41 3.12 2.87 2.59 3.42** 3.44** 3.49** 3.44** 3.42** 3.45** 
 (3.11) (3.09) (3.10) (3.12) (3.13) (3.03) (1.52) (1.52) (1.52) (1.52) (1.52) (1.51) 
Democracy2 -1.12 -0.62 -0.98 -1.86 -1.86 -0.82 -2.78* -2.83* -2.88* -2.82* -2.73* -2.80* 
 (2.86) (2.86) (2.86) (2.82) (2.84) (2.77) (1.58) (1.57) (1.58) (1.58) (1.57) (1.57) 
Peace Decay       -0.62* -0.61 -0.59 -0.61* -0.70* -0.61 
       (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37) 
Constant -0.97 -0.08 -2.80** -2.32* -3.55*** -2.08*       
 (1.80) (1.92) (1.15) (1.30) (1.07) (1.15)       
AIC 1,404 1,403 1,404 1,404 1,405 1,400       
No. of Observations 5,007 5,007 5,007 5,007 5,007 5,007       
No. of Countries 150 150 150 150 150 150       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A8. GDP and the onset of civil war excluding influential observations 







































GDP per capita (log) -0.61      -0.09      
(0.40)      (0.28)      
Total Private 
Production/pc (log) 
 -1.02**      0.00     
 (0.46)      (0.30)     
Total Private 
Investment/pc (log) 
  -0.28      0.09    
  (0.26)      (0.16)    
Total Government 
Spending/pc (log) 
   -0.56*      0.02   
   (0.32)      (0.18)   
Total Exports/pc (log)     -0.03      -0.22  
    (0.25)      (0.14)  
Total Imports/pc (log)      -0.82***      -0.01 
     (0.29)      (0.17) 
Discrimination 0.90*** 0.92*** 0.90*** 0.86*** 0.92*** 0.89*** -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.27 -0.25 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Oil Production -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Neighbor at War -0.26 -0.48 -0.10 -0.11 -0.18 -0.45 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.07 
 (0.95) (0.95) (0.95) (0.95) (0.95) (0.92) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
Trade openness -2.32** -2.13** -2.38** -2.25** -2.66** -0.13 -0.82 -0.84 -0.92 -0.84 -0.17 -0.78 
 (0.99) (0.96) (1.04) (1.00) (1.35) (1.21) (0.70) (0.69) (0.71) (0.70) (0.81) (0.82) 
Democracy -0.30 -0.65 -0.52 0.49 -0.26 0.06 2.53 2.56 2.61 2.57 2.53 2.57 
 (4.06) (4.03) (4.07) (4.07) (4.11) (3.97) (1.60) (1.60) (1.61) (1.61) (1.60) (1.60) 
Democracy2 2.33 3.28 2.19 1.40 1.47 2.58 -1.70 -1.75 -1.83 -1.77 -1.67 -1.75 
 (3.69) (3.71) (3.71) (3.62) (3.67) (3.57) (1.69) (1.69) (1.69) (1.69) (1.68) (1.68) 
Peace Decay       -0.43 -0.42 -0.40 -0.42 -0.51 -0.42 
       (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.40) 
Constant 0.91 3.49 -2.00 -0.56 -3.08** -0.04       
 (2.95) (3.22) (1.61) (1.89) (1.42) (1.63)       
AIC 1,115 1,155 1,158 1,157 1,157 1,152       
No. of Observations 4,819 4,819 4,819 4,819 4,819 4,819       
No. of Countries 145 145 145 145 145 145       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Region fixed effects omitted from table.
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Figure 1. Between Effects of Consumption Opportunities on Civil War Onset 
 
 





Figure A2. Cross-Time Variation in the Share of C, I, G, X and M in Venezuela 
 
 






Figure A4. Key Independent Variables Univariate Kernal Density – Between Indicators 
 
 




Figure A6. Control Variables Univariate Kernal Density – Between Indicators 
 
 





Figure A8. DFBETA leverage analysis 
 
